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Abstract: Credit markets in many Eastern European countries are now dominated by 
foreign-owned banks. We analyze the development for foreign ownership and its impact 
on lending rate in ten Eastern European countries between 1995 and 2003. Currently, the 
majority of loans from foreign banks is granted by acquired banks. The presence of 
foreign acquired banks as measured by their relative number among the banks in our 
dataset increased somewhat slower than that of foreign de novo banks. However, since 
market entry through acquisition allows acquiring a credit portfolio and a customer base, 
acquired banks were able to expand their market share much faster than the foreign de 
novo banks. Our results also show that the interest rate decreased after foreign bank entry. 
Moreover, while the reduction in interest rates of domestic banks is more pronounced in 
the case of foreign entry through a de novo investment, foreign de novo banks charge 
higher interest rates than foreign acquired banks.  
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1. Introduction 
Many emerging countries are hesitant about letting foreign banks enter their 
market. When deciding on the liberalization of the banking sector, policy makers weigh 
the costs and benefits of foreign bank entry on the domestic banks and on the corporate 
sector. On the one hand, governments fear that foreign banks will engage in cherry 
picking, leaving the domestic banks with bad loans in their portfolio. On the other hand, 
the local banking market can benefit from the better technologies that foreign banks use 
through learning and spillover effects. Through an increase in bank competition, 
domestic firms may gain by paying lower interest rates for their loans.  
The empirical facts about bank market entry differ substantially between regions. 
In Europe, for instance, foreign bank market share in banking sector total assets amounts 
to about 55 per cent in 2003 in the new EU member states, while being almost absent in 
the large EU-15 countries (ECB, 2005). This is surprising, because there are no formal 
restrictions on market entry. Interestingly, the foreign-owned banks in more developed 
countries have a lower profitability than domestic banks (Claessens et al., 2001).  
Rather the opposite situation is found in emerging countries. In these markets, 
foreign banks are often more profitable and efficient than domestic banks (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2000, Bonin et al., 2005, Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). More 
importantly, foreign bank presence may improve access to credit for creditworthy firms 
(Giannetti and Ongena, 2005). In Eastern Europe, foreign bank entry has increased 
competition and improved lending technologies such that lending to SME and retail 
markets gradually increased (De Haas and Naaborg, 2005). 
Policy makers do not only decide on the liberalization of bank entry but often also 
on the mode of entry. Depending on their evaluation of the entry mode, governments 
provide incentives that encourage foreign bank entry either through a greenfield 
investment, by establishing a foreign de novo bank, or through acquisition. However, 
while empirical evidence shows that foreign de novo banks are more profitable and 
efficient than foreign acquired banks (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004, Majnoni et al., 
2003), the differential impact of the mode of entry on domestic bank lending conditions 
and competition remains unclear. 
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In this paper, we shed light on how the impact of foreign bank entry on the host 
country depends on the entry mode. We analyze the impact of the mode of entry on 
competition. Specifically, we investigate the effects of the mode of foreign bank entry on 
the lending rate in markets where firms heavily depend on bank financing: are lending 
rates higher if foreign entry predominantly happens through the establishment of a de 
novo bank or through the acquisition of a domestic bank? Neither the theoretical nor the 
empirical literature provides complete answers to this question. 
We focus on the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, where 
foreign banks are now dominating the market (foreign bank market shares went up from 
approximately 10 percent in 1995 to almost 64 percent in 2003, on average). 
Furthermore, these markets are characterized by heterogeneous forms of market entry, 
that moreover vary over time. This allows scope to analyze the direct or initial impact of 
foreign entry. 
 
2. The impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on creditor information 
In Claeys and Hainz (2006), we develop a theoretical model in which domestic 
banks possess private information about their incumbent clients but foreign banks have 
better screening skills. We argue that, after foreign bank entry, information on old and 
new firms’ creditworthiness is unevenly distributed between the foreign and the domestic 
bank. First, the domestic bank has access to soft information of those firms with which it 
has already established a relationship in the past. This generates an absolute information 
advantage for the domestic bank about these old firms’ creditworthiness. Second, in an 
emerging market context, the foreign bank is assumed to possess better screening skills 
than the domestic bank. This implies that the foreign bank will be able to better process 
hard information about new firms that apply for credit through credit evaluation. We 
show that this information advantage allows the foreign bank to offer slightly lower rates 
than the domestic bank. However, the information advantage also enables the foreign 
bank to extract rents from firms that apply for credit for the first time when offering 
credit contracts. Foreign banks will therefore be able to offer more competitive rates than 
the domestic bank to new applicants. As a result, foreign bank entry will drive down a 
country’s average interest rate for new loans. 
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However, the foreign bank’s scope for extracting rents from new applicants 
depends on the mode of entry. A foreign de novo bank will only enter the market if its 
advantage in screening new firms compensates the disadvantage it has compared to the 
domestic banks with respect to soft information about old firms. If a foreign bank 
acquires a domestic bank, it also acquires the credit portfolio which contains information 
about the quality of client firms. In addition to this acquired information, the bank 
possesses superior screening skills compared to domestic banks. The distribution of 
information between domestic and foreign banks and consequently the degree of 
competition depend on the mode of entry. We refer to this differential effect as a 
‘competition effect’ that depends on the mode of entry. 
This argument indicates that interest rates for new creditors will be lower when 
the foreign bank enters the market by establishing a foreign de novo bank compared to 
acquiring a domestic bank. However, the average interest rate that a bank demands 
depends on a bank's portfolio composition of newly applying and old firms. Therefore, 
we additionally analyze what we refer to as the ‘portfolio composition effect’. Old firms 
might get more favourable rates from their incumbent bank, such that the average lending 
rate demanded by acquired banks may still be lower than the one from a foreign de novo 
bank. 
 
3. Entry policy in Central and Eastern Europe 
The disperse process of deregulation in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe led to an uneven reduction of the barriers to entry. The countries that we analyze 
are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia for the period 1995-2003. These countries have shown 
widely different policies towards the mode of foreign bank entry.1 Foreign bank entry 
was sometimes allowed already early in transition - with changing restrictions on the 
mode of entry. 
The example of Poland illustrates how government policy has changed during the 
last 15 years. In the very beginning of the transition process, bank entry was not 
                                                 
1 For an overview, see Bonin et al. (1998). For a detailed listing on foreign de novo entry, foreign and 
domestic mergers and acquisitions between 1990 and 2003 in Central and Eastern Europe, we refer to 
Claeys and Hainz (2005). 
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regulated. Foreign banks were even given tax holidays. After many small, 
undercapitalized banks had entered, the minimum capital requirement increased and tax 
holidays for foreign banks were eliminated. Starting in 1992, the Polish government 
preferred selling its weak domestic banks to foreign owners over issuing new bank 
licenses to foreign banks. The aim of the politicians was to sell (often) weak domestic 
banks to foreign banks, which brought in new capital and could use their expertise to 
restructure these banks. Between 1993 and 1997 the first banks were privatized, but the 
government was mainly selling minority shares to foreign investors. In 1999 the 
government started to sell majority shares of the state-owned banks to foreign investors 
and allowed foreign banks to open branches without restraints (NBP, 2001). 
 
4. Data for ownership structure 
We want to determine and compare what average lending rates look like if a 
foreign bank enters either through a de novo investment or through acquisition. For this 
purpose, we create a database that captures the time-varying ownership structure of 
individual banks in Central and Eastern Europe. 
We use yearly data of about 200 individual banks in 10 Eastern European 
transition countries, for the period 1995-2003. For each country, we gather commercial 
banks' balance sheets and income and loss accounts from the BankScope database 
maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk. Consolidated statements were preferred but 
unconsolidated statements were used when the consolidated one was not available. We 
obtain historical bank-specific ownership data from central and commercial banks' annual 
reports. Each bank is classified as either domestically or foreign owned, whereby a 
foreign bank can be the result of a cross-border acquisition or a greenfield investment. A 
bank is classified as foreign when at least 50 per cent of its shares is foreign owned. We 
distinguish between banks that are foreign owned since the start of the sample in the year 
1995 and banks that become foreign owned from 1995 onwards. Each foreign bank can 
enter the sample either as a foreign de novo bank or as a foreign acquired bank. 
In order to capture the differences in information distribution and screening skills 
as described above, we assume that for each bank the following events related to 
acquisition can occur during the sample period: 
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(1) foreign de novo bank acquires a domestic bank; 
(2) foreign acquired bank acquires domestic, foreign acquired or foreign de novo bank; 
(3) foreign de novo bank acquires foreign de novo bank; 
(4) domestic bank acquires domestic bank. 
 
For case (1), the merged bank is classified as having entered via acquisition from 
the date of acquisition onwards. For case (2), banks remain classified as foreign acquired 
banks. This classification enables us to distinguish between banks which have (a) access 
to soft information but have inferior screening skills (domestic banks), (b) soft 
information and a superior screening ability (foreign acquired banks) and (c) only 
screening ability (foreign de novo banks). For cases (3) and (4) we assume that these 
mergers simply lead to bigger banks, without generating an impact on information 
distribution. 
 
5. Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the average percentage of foreign bank presence and market 
share in total loans by mode of entry for the period 1992-2003.  
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Foreign bank participation has increased dramatically. In 1992, about 16 per cent 
of the banks in our sample were foreign owned. Foreign bank presence rose to 57 per 
cent in 2003, in which year they represent a market share of 64 per cent. In the beginning 
of the 1990s, the majority of foreign bank entry is via the establishment of a de novo 
bank. While foreign de novo banks represent on average 22 per cent, foreign bank 
acquisitions account for 14 per cent. However, foreign acquired banks gradually increase 
their presence over the years and represent 33 per cent of all banks in our sample by 
2003. Foreign acquisitions eventually become the dominant mode of entry: banks that are 
foreign acquired between 1992 and 2003 have a market share of 25 per cent, on average, 
while foreign banks that entered the Central and Eastern European banking markets 
through a de novo investment have on average a market share of 11 per cent. Since 
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foreign acquired banks buy a customer base, their market share grows much faster than 
that of de novo banks. In 2003, foreign acquired banks possess a market share of 48 per 
cent whereas foreign de novo banks only have 16 per cent of the credit market. 
Figures 1 and 2 show how foreign bank presence varies over countries and over 
time, by mode of entry. Figure 1 presents the percentage of foreign bank presence; figure 
2 shows market shares starting from 1995.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2] 
 
The figures reveal some important differences between the countries. The figures 
show that countries that joined the European Union already in May 2004 differ from 
those applying for membership in 2007. In Bulgaria and Croatia, the neighbours of the 
enlarged European Union, the market share of foreign banks is about 46 per cent and 36 
per cent respectively in 2003 and thereby remains significantly lower than in the other 
eight countries.  
In Hungary, foreign banks already outnumbered domestic banks in 1993. Due to 
the Hungarian liberalization strategy that started in the early 1980s, the share of foreign 
banks has gradually risen and now represents more than 70 percent of the market. In the 
beginning of the 1990s, also the Czech Republic and the Polish banking sector were 
characterized by a large inflow of foreign de novo banks. The cumulative market share 
for de novo banks is, however, relatively small (7 and 17 per cent) compared to the 
market share for de novo banks in Hungary (24 per cent). In 1999 the Polish government 
started to sell majority shares of domestic banks to foreign investors. This led the number 
of foreign banks in Poland to exceed the number of domestic banks in 1999 and dominate 
the market in terms of market share since 2000. 
The Baltic countries started liberalizing market entry into the banking sector 
relatively late. Therefore, the changes observed are even more dramatic. Estonia, for 
example, has only three foreign-owned banks (AS Sampo Pank, Hansabank and Eesti 
Uhispank), but Hansabank alone accounts for over 70 percent of assets since 2001 
(Claeys and Hainz, 2005). Thus, banking in Estonia can be considered as predominantly a 
foreign affair. 
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In Slovakia, foreign banks already entered in the early 1990s but they did not 
become significant players before the year 2000. Although Slovenia is characterized by a 
relatively low percentage of foreign bank presence, foreign banks obtained over 60 per 
cent of bank loans by 2002. These loans are almost exclusively granted by foreign 
acquired banks. Foreign de novo banks hardly play a role on the credit market in 
Slovenia. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that there is a considerable amount of foreign entry 
occurring in most countries included in our sample. Furthermore, the market shares of 
foreign banks have gradually risen and are starting to dominate the market. Together with 
the increase in foreign acquisitions, banking markets became more and more 
concentrated. This resulted in an average market share of almost 60 per cent held by the 
top 3 banks per country. 
 
6. Evolution of bank lending rates by ownership structure 
Figure 3 presents the evolution of average bank lending rates and foreign bank 
market shares between 1995 and 2003. Compared to Western Europe, bank interest rates 
are still relatively high, but decreased significantly from 22 per cent in 1995 to 13 per 
cent in 2003. At the same time, foreign bank market shares increased dramatically to 
about 64 per cent.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
In Claeys and Hainz (2006), we perform a regression analysis which confirms that 
a higher foreign bank share in loans negatively impacts the average lending rate, which 
supports the competition effect that we describe above. Moreover, we document that an 
increase in foreign de novo market share leads to a bigger reduction in domestic bank 
average lending rates compared to the reduction following an increase in foreign acquired 
market share. This indicates that competition is more intense when entry predominantly 
happened through foreign de novo investments. 
Since we cannot disentangle individual bank-firm relationships through bank 
balances, we cannot observe the share of old and new firms that apply for credit at the 
bank. We do however observe the average interest rate that banks charge to both types of 
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customers. Figure 4 graphs how the average lending rate evolves per year after the 
foreign bank has entered the market, by mode of entry. Figure 4 also shows the evolution 
of domestic bank interest rates over the years after entry. From the figure it is clear that 
on average, foreign banks charge lower interest rates than domestic banks (15.5 and 18.5 
per cent respectively). However, in the first year after entry, foreign and domestic bank 
lending rates do not differ significantly. Furthermore, domestic banks have been 
operating relatively longer in the market compared to foreign banks. One corollary of this 
is that in the first year after entry, foreign banks may be charging higher rates than 
domestic banks that have been in the market longer at that time. However, foreign banks 
reduce their lending rates much faster compared to domestic banks after entry. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
Indeed, using regression analysis, we find that foreign acquired banks charge 
between 1 and 2 per cent less than domestic banks, while foreign de novo banks charge, 
on average, almost 1 per cent more than domestic banks. Furthermore, while foreign 
acquired banks already charge less in the first year after acquisition, foreign de novo 
banks initially charge higher lending rates than domestic banks, but quickly reduce their 
interest rate in the first years after entry. Finally, our results point out that foreign de novo 
banks charge higher lending rates than foreign acquired banks, which indicates that the 
loan portfolio composition effect dominates the competition effect. The loan portfolio 
composition effect allows both the domestic and the foreign acquired banks to charge 
lower average lending rates. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Credit markets in many Eastern European countries are now dominated by 
foreign-owned banks. This ownership structure resulted from the liberalization of foreign 
bank entry in the early 1990s and the privatization of state-owned banks, mainly by 
selling majority shares to foreign investors. The majority of loans from foreign banks is 
granted by acquired banks. The presence of foreign acquired banks as measured by their 
relative number among the banks in our dataset increased somewhat slower than that of 
foreign de novo banks. However, since market entry through acquisition allows acquiring 
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a credit portfolio and a customer base, acquired banks were able to expand their market 
share much faster than the foreign de novo banks. Our results also show that the interest 
rate decreased after foreign bank entry. Moreover, while the reduction in domestic 
interest rates is more pronounced in the case of foreign entry through a de novo 
investment, foreign de novo banks charge higher interest rates than foreign acquired 
banks. This result is consistent with the prediction of our theoretical analysis according to 
which competition increases more if the foreign bank enters as a de novo bank. 
 
References 
Bonin, John P., Kalman Miszei, István P. Székely and Paul Wachtel (1998), ‘Banking in 
Transition Economies: Developing Market Oriented Banking Sectors in Eastern 
Europe’, Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham and Northampton. 
Bonin, John P., Iftekhar Hasan and Paul Wachtel (2005), ‘Privatization Matters: Bank 
Efficiency in Transition Countries’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29 (1), 31-
53. 
Claessens, Stijn, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry Huizinga (2001), ‘How Does Foreign 
Entry Affect Domestic Banking Markets’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 25, 
891-911. 
Claeys, Sophie and Christa Hainz (2006), ‘Acquisition versus Greenfield: The Impact of 
the Mode of Foreign Bank Entry on Information and Bank Lending Rates’, 
mimeo.  
Claeys, Sophie and Christa Hainz (2005), ‘Acquisition versus Greenfield: The Mode of 
Foreign Bank Entry in Central and Eastern Europe: Data Appendix’, mimeo. 
de Haas, Ralph and Ilko Naaborg (2005),’Does Foreign Bank Entry Reduce Small Firms 
Access to Credit? Evidence from European Transition Economies’, De 
Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper, No. 50, August 2005. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Harry Huizinga (2000), ‘Determinants of Commercial Bank 
Interest Margins and Profitability: Some International Evidence’, World Bank 
Economic Review, 13, 379-408. 
European Central Bank (2005), EU Banking Structures, October 2005. 
 11
Giannetti, Mariassunta, and Steven Ongena (2005), ‘Financial Integration and Entrepre-
neurial Activity: Evidence from Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Markets’, 
mimeo, Stockholm School of Economics. 
Majnoni, Giovanni, Rashmi Shankar and Eva Vàrhegyi (2003), ‘The Dynamics of 
Foreign Bank Ownership: Evidence from Hungary’, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 3114, August 2003. 
Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad and Ashoka Mody (2004), ‘How Foreign Participation 
and Market Concentration Impact Bank Spreads: Evidence from Latin America’, 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 36 (3)), 511-537. 
National Bank of Poland, (2001), ‘The Polish Banking System in the Nineties’, NBP 
Research Paper. 
 
 
Figure 1: Foreign bank presence by mode of entry (%). 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope, central banks and bank annual reports. 
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Figure 2: Foreign bank market share by mode of entry (%).  
 
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope, central banks and bank annual reports. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of bank lending rates (right scale) and foreign bank market share (left scale) 
(%). 
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Figure 4: Average lending rates by mode of entry: Evolution per year after entry. 
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Note: Bank lending rates (%) are calculated as interest income over (two year) average loans (3 
year moving average). Foreign MA: a foreign bank that acquires a domestic bank and obtains a 
majority ownership share. Foreign De Novo: a foreign bank that enters the market as a de novo 
bank that has a majority foreign ownership share. Domestic: a domestic bank.  
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope and central banks and bank annual reports. 
 
 
Table 1: Foreign bank presence and market share by mode of entry (%). 
 
       
Year Foreign Bank Foreign MA Foreign De Novo 
       
 
Foreign bank 
presence (%) 
Market 
share (%) 
Foreign bank 
presence (%) 
Market 
share (%) 
Foreign bank 
presence (%) 
Market 
share (%) 
1992 15.96  2.66  13.30  
1993 18.47  3.15  15.32  
1994 20.73  2.85  17.89  
1995 22.39 10.82 3.47 0.82 18.92 10.00
1996 27.05 8.02 5.00 2.48 22.14 5.54
1997 32.75 16.28 10.14 9.76 22.73 6.53
1998 36.65 25.36 12.59 16.74 24.46 8.62
1999 41.25 35.23 15.75 25.38 25.98 9.85
2000 47.03 45.48 21.79 34.18 25.64 11.30
2001 50.66 55.37 25.33 40.64 25.78 14.73
2002 52.63 62.36 29.47 46.65 23.67 15.71
2003 56.93 63.94 33.00 48.34 24.50 15.61
       
   
Average 35.21 35.87 13.77 25.00 21.69 10.88
   
        
 
Note: Foreign MA: a foreign bank that acquires a domestic bank and obtains a majority ownership 
share. Foreign De Novo: a foreign bank that enters the market as a de novo bank that has a 
majority foreign ownership share. Foreign bank presence (%) is the relative number of foreign to 
domestic banks. Foreign bank market share (%) is the ratio of foreign loans to the country total. 
The sum of values for Foreign MA and Foreign De Novo can differ from the value for Foreign 
Bank due to rounding differences. 
Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope and central bank and bank annual reports.  
 
